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Recent TheorIes In economIcs cIa I m ThaT markeTs so I ve noT on I y The 
classical allocation problem of getting buyers and sellers TogeTher 
efficiently but ThaT markets can also perform another funcTion. Namely, 
markets can aggregaTe and disseminate informaTion. By watching The price of a 
sTock, "ouTsiders" can Infer whaT insiders know. This is a var i anT of The 
raTional expecTaTions hypothesis. If a group of insiders are compeTing for 
secur iTies In Th e - markeT, someone ouTside The firm can learn almosT anything 
abouT the company by simply waTching the economic consequences of the behavior 
of these people. This Incredible Idea is thaT markets themselves can serve to 
aggregate and disseminate information ThaT no one in particular has an 
interesT in allowing other people to know. Our original research was based on 
The assumptIon ThaT thIs l dea is bananas. In th l s Ta I k I w II I provIde you 
wiTh some brief Impressions of whaT we have observed. 
Figure 1 Is an experimenT from some that were done several years ago. 
ConsIder an asset that has a one-per I od I I fe. The return to an i nd i vI dua I 
depends upon The sTaTe of nature. The state of naTure can be either state x 
or state y. For a Type 1 Individual, if x happens to occur, the security pays 
a reTurn of 1 00. If y happens to occur, the security pays a return of 350. 
Type 1 peop I e are hoping for state y. . The probab i I i ty of x is one-third and 
the probabll tty of y Is two-thirds, so the expected value of a unit for Type 1 
Individuals would be 266.7. For a Type 2 person, If x occurs, the secur ity 
will pay a dividend of 200; staTe y would y i eld a dividend of 300, so the 
expected value of a uniT for a Type 2 person w ould be 267. A Type 3 person 
gets 240 If x and 175 If y, with an expected value of 196. The security pays 
different dividends depending upon the type of holder. This is similar to 
differing Tax brackets and/or differi ng r i sk p references among i n vesTor s. 
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Consider how this market might work. There is a fixed supply of 
securities Initially held equally among market ag·ents. Suppose that everyone 
knows the state Is x. Type 1 peop I e wou I d se I I any hoI dings; Type 2 peop I e 
would also sel I out; and Type 3 people would absorb them alI and since there 
will be several Type 3 people they would bid the price up to 240. So� if 
everyone knows the state of nature Is x the price of the security wll I be 240. 
Suppose the state of nature is y and everyone knows that. Type 1 people 
wll I absorb alI holdings and the price wil I be bid up to 350. 
Suppose that no one knows anything about the state. Type 2 people have 
an expected value of 267, so they wll I compete against each other and absorb 
alI the securities at an expected value of 267. This assumes, of course, that 
alI agents are risk neutral, which is OK for the purposes of explanation of 
the model. 
Consider now what the rational expectations theory adds to this. Suppose 
some people know the state of nature and others don't. Assume some insiders 
and some outsiders exist for alI types of people. When the state· of nature is 
y there is no problem because Type 1 people would just bid the price up to 350 
and they wou I d absorb the entl re supp I y. If the state of nature is x, 
however, the prIce wou I d fa I I away from 350 and If there are some uninformed 
Type 2's and some uninformed Type 1 1s who have expected values In the range of 
267 these outsiders would, according to one theory, start absorbing and cause 
the price to settle In the 267 range. Rational expectations theory says this 
won 1 t happen. From the prIce behavIor outsIders w I I I I earn that the state i's 
not y. If the state were y the price would be 350 so If the price is not 350 
the state must be x. But If they know the state Is x the price w i I I fa I I to 
240. So from the price behavior alone, the uninformed Type 1 and Type 2 
peep I e w II I know to avo! d buying at prIces above 240. The pattern of the 
prices wil I be as though everyone is informed. The outsiders wll I learn the 
state from the Insiders just by looking at the price. 
Our genera I d I sbe I I ef 1 n thIs story I ead to the paper "Etf I c I ency of 
Ex per I menta I SecurIty Markets wIth InsIder In format I on: An App I I cat I on of 
Rat! ona I Expectatl ons Mode Is," Joy rna I of Pol I tlca I Economy, vol . 9, August, 
1982, pp. 663-698. The parameters were substantially as explained above. The 
pr I nc·l pa I resu It was that wIth rep I I catIons of market conditIons there is 
substantIa I evidence that the mode I Is correct. PrIces adjusted as though 
agents were fully informed. Insiders and outsiders made about equal profits. 
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The mechanism through wh ich the state is revealed rema ins unknown but It 
probably is located in the (possibly unaccepted) bids and offers. 
The moral of the story Is that the expected uti I lty hypothesis In these 
sImp I e markets Is a very good mode I • A I so � the rat I ona I expectatIons mode I 
apparently holds. And� If we appl led the fair game hypothesis the market is 
efficient In the sense that filter rules do not beat buy and hold. 
Our current proj ect builds on these results. The rational expectat ions 
model actually makes a much deeper assertion than s imply that markets 
disseminate lnformatJon. Suppose different Insiders have a I ltt l e different 
pass at the truth. The rational expectations model asserts that such bits of 
I nformatl on w I I I be aggregated by the market. In part I cuI ar suppose that 
there are three states: x� y, and z. If the state Is x, some people would be 
told that the state Is either x or y, and other people would be told that the 
state Is either x or z. That Is� some people know that It Is not y and others 
know that the state Is not z. The market "knows with certainty" the 
underlying state Is x but no Individual knows lt. The rational expectations 
hypothesIs says that somehow thIs know I edge Is goIng to become poo I ed and 
everyone� Insiders and outsiders� wll I act as If they know the state 
perfectly. This Is a much more compl lcated phenomenon. Not only must the 
market dIssemInate I nformatl on from InsIders to outsIders, It must actua I I y 
pool the Information In a statistical sense. 
Many new experiments have been conducted. The Initial periods of several 
markets were cases In whIch no I nd I vI dua I had Information about the state. 
Generally the markets converged to the maximum expected value .  These periods 
served as controls on the experiments . The primary focus was on markets with 
diverse Inf ormation and diverse preferences as described above. The results 
show some variation across experiments. There is some evidence of bubbles, 
for examp I e� but the genera I and I mportant cone I us I on Is unambIguous. The 
markets do not behave In accord wIth rat I on a I expectatIons theory. The 
information Is not aggregated and the markets are not efficient. However, the 
markets are efficient according to the efficient market hypothesis. They are 
fair games. Buy and hold cannot be beat by filters In any of the markets. 
But, the markets are not efficient markets In the rational expectations sense. 
The data demonstrate that the efficient markets hypot h esis is not a sufficient 
test for efficIency of the under I y I ng market. It doesn't work, and we have 
studied many experimental markets that demonstrate the po int . 
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When the Insiders know bits and pieces of Information the market just 
doesn't necessarl ly aggregate alI of ft. Of course with more time, 
repl !cations, experience, etc. the market might do It but that is not obvious 
now. In fact, our attempts to control time and experience suggest that more 
of each w i I I not be enough to get the markets to work as theoret 1 ca 1 1 y 
anticipated. 
The next thing we studied was state contingent securities. The compound 
security was divided Into three state contingent securities. The x security 
paid the x state dividend If x occurred and zero otherwise. Another security, 
the y security , paid If y occurred and zero otherwise, and a third security 
paid the z dividend If z occurred and zero otherwise. The three securities 
together co I I ect I ve I y make the compound securIty of the previous markets. 
These markets had more Instruments In the market than the prevIous sing I e 
compound security markets but col lectlvely the Instruments look I Ike the 
compound security . 
In terms of the previous two state example, If the state Is x the price 
of the x security should be 240 and alI of the x security should be held by 
Type 3 people. They security should be worth zero since y has not occurred. 
And, generally If a third state exists, the z security should also be worth 
zero since z has not occurred. If z occurs then the z security should be 
priced at the maximum dividend and the other two securities should be worth 
zero. 
Figure 2 contains the results of one experiment. The market opened with 
state contingent securities. The first period state was x. With these. 
parameters the price of x should be 460 and the other two securities should be 
priced at zero. As can be seen the contract prices represented by the dots 
are above zero In alI three security markets. The next period the state is z. 
One trade occurs In the x market before the price plunges to near zero. A few 
trades occur In the y market but vo I ume and prIces In the z market are 
cl imblng toward the 600 predicted. In the next period the state is y. Notice 
the price of the x security drops to zero immediately. The z market has only 
one trade. Everyone rea I I y knows from the behavior of the markets that the 
state Is y and the value of the y security Is near the competitive price of 
320. 
The central conclusion Is unambiguous. When the markets are complete the 
Information Is completely and unambiguously aggregated. The rational 
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expectatons mode l wor ks . 
Before the beginning of per i od 10 the complete securities were collapsed 
Into a single security. The setting i s  the same as first studied. The prices 
just meander as they did In other compound security markets. The market looks 
1 i ke an eff ic i ent market according to the efficient market (fair game) 
hy pothesIs but It Is not. AgaIn, even after the exper i ence of the comp I ete 
markets, the markets failed to attain rational expectations pri ces. 
We did this type of experiment several times to confirm our f i nd i ngs. 
Finally we studied a market in which everyone had the same d i vidend. In 
the two markets we conducted with uniform dividends the results were the same 
as those In complete markets. I nformatl on aggregatl on was outstandIng. The 
rational expectations model works. People have different i nformation 
t n l t t a I I y so gal ns from trade ext st. After the market has operated for 
awhile, however, the market almost dries up. If everyone has the same pay of f 
and 1 f everyone knows the state of nature there Is no one to trade wIth. 
Trade only occurs If there Is a difference of opinion. 
To summarize: We know first that demand-supply laws work as advert i sed 
in sImp I e s ttuatl ens--markets are eft I cl ent, very I itt I e centra I ized 
In format i on Is needed for them to work. Alternative i deas I ike labor theory 
of va I ue .3re wrong. Second I y we know that l nst l tut i ona I deta i Is are very 
tmport()nt to the workIng of the I aws. In the markets we have studied we 
suspect that bids In the trading pit Itself are a vehicle through which much 
of the Information Is transferred. We have studied posted price, sealed bid, 
one-sided auctions and futures markets. The expected uti I i ty hypothesis is 
pretty good. We use It alI the time. It's not perfect, but It's not bad. We 
know that the markets can dIssemInate I nformatl on from outsiders to i ns i ders. 
The rat I on a I expectatIons mode I ho I ds on both prIces and prof i ts tests when 
some people know the state with certainty. The fair game test of efficiency 
hoi ds In thIs case. And we know that pr Ice Is not the on I y means that 
transfers Information. Finally, In terms of Information aggregat i on, wh i ch i s  
more compl lcated, we know that the rational expectations model is not rei fable 
In a single security market. The Information does not necessar i ly g et 
aggregated. We know a I so that the faIr game tes-ts thai" are app I I ed so 
frequently are unreliable as Indicators about when an under lying market is 
operating inefficien-tly .  Fair game tests can I nd i cate eff iciency when in fact 
the market Is n ot eft I c i ent. If markets are comp I ete in the sense of a 
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complete set of state contingent securities or If preferences are sufficiently 
s lml 1 ar in the sIng I e securl ty market case, the rat! ona I expectatl ons model 
works substantIa I I y as advert I sed. In these cases the InformatIon becomes 
aggregated and alI agents behave as If they were perfectly Informed. 
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